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Introduction
Case study and narrative are essential and complemen-
tary ways to understand history: case study dissects his-
torical events into their logical elements, whereas narra-
tive connects us to the sum of these elements, which may 
be  startlingly  different  from  the  outcomes  predicted  by 
logic. The historical stories in this report describe selected 
US public health events from 1900 to 1932 and link these 
experiences  to  modern  leadership  challenges  in  public 
health policy.
In 1991 Richmond and Kotelchuck proposed a model for 
public policy that can be represented by a 3-circle Venn 
diagram  (1,2).  The  circles  represent  scientific  evidence 
(sound data regarding the problem), social infrastructure 
(systems in place to support a solution), and political will 
(public support and resources to achieve the solution). In 
the center of the diagram, where these 3 sectors overlap, 
is public policy (Figure).
The  stories  in  this  article  illustrate  how  the  sectors 
of this model came together, for better or worse, in the 
early 20th century in the United States. Hookworms in 
the South (worms), cholera infantum in New York City 
(germs), adulterated alcohol in the Midwest (drink), and 
pellagra in the Mississippi Delta (dementia) are examined 
in terms of how diseases and their victims were viewed, 
diagnosed, and treated at that time. Medical progress also 
affected these events, but the history of medicine is not my 
primary focus.
For public health professionals, the science and infra-
structure sectors of the Richmond-Kotelchuck model are 
often where we feel most comfortable and best trained. 
The  descriptions  of  Southeastern  hookworm  health 
education programs, infant milk distribution systems, 
adulterated  alcohol  investigations,  and  Goldberger’s 
pellagra research all resonate with our experience and 
expertise.
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Political will is another matter. Why did Southerners 
refuse to believe hookworm and pellagra existed in their 
states? Why did a 20-year partnership of physicians and 
social progressives collapse and scatter the resources for 
infant  health  programs?  Why  was  there  little  outrage 
when tens of thousands of Americans were paralyzed by a 
poisoned patent medicine? Why did public health leaders 
play only small roles in these widespread health events?
It can be argued that most of our failures are in the 
arena of political will. Health policy courses appear in pub-
lic health education curricula, but even experienced public 
health leaders trip on the complexity of political interac-
tions. Public health practitioners in government agencies 
may be further restricted because of our responsibilities as 
public servants to remain apolitical. Our efforts to affect 
public policy are often frustrated.
Health is inextricably woven into the geography, war-
fare, politics, poverty, population, infrastructure, economy, 
and prejudices of a region. As Szreter has noted:
The  problem,  of  course,  with  emphasizing  the 
importance of politics, the conflict of ideas, the role 
of the state, conditions of citizenship, local govern-
ment structures and services, civil institutions and 
social  capital  in  accounting  for  the  relationship 
between  public  health  and  social  and  economic 
change is that this makes for a devilishly compli-
cated story (3).
We  usually  analyze  history  by  teasing  out  each  of 
these  elements  for  in-depth  case  study.  The  Richmond-
Kotelchuck  model  offers  a  more  integrated  approach  to 
recognizing the missing elements for sound policy. This 
article  provides  such  analyses;  it  also  seeks  to  do  the 
reverse — to bring all the elements into narratives that 
illustrate how public policy is conceived. The psychiatrist 
Naomi Remen wrote Kitchen Table Wisdom to describe 
the importance of sharing stories for her cancer patients, 
many of whom were terminally ill (4). “Telling stories is 
not just a way of passing time,” she noted. “It is the way 
the  wisdom  gets  passed  along.”  Stories  are  not  simply 
for  individual  inspiration:  they  are  an  essential  part  of 
explaining the world. I hope these narratives offer wisdom 
and provide data to illustrate a policy model. The last por-
tion of this article examines the Heifetz model of adaptive 
leadership  and  the  challenge  for  public  health  leaders 
in  times  of  social  shifts  such  as  the  ones  these  stories 
describe. I conclude by considering how the wisdom gained 
from historical analysis and story may lead to change in 
public policy.
These  stories  are  not  meant  to  be  primary  historical 
accounts.  Most  of  the  material  comes  from  secondary 
sources.
Prologue: The Gilded Age
For a better understanding of health conditions during 
the early 20th century, it is necessary to understand the 
economic and social context of the late 1800s. Between the 
end of the post-Civil War Reconstruction period and the 
economic panic of 1893, the nation experienced another 
kind of wrenching civil conflict, that between an agrarian 
economy  and  an  industrial  one.  Telephones,  electricity, 
internal  combustion  engines,  and  cross-continental  rail-
roads all came into use. A laissez-faire economic approach, 
encouraging unregulated financial power and free market 
principles,  led  to  accumulation  of  enormous  wealth  by 
“captains of industry”: John D. Rockefeller in oil, Andrew 
Carnegie in steel, and Cornelius Vanderbilt in railroads. 
The conspicuous consumption and public profiles of the 
country’s most favored citizens led to this era’s name, the 
Gilded Age.
Initially it seemed that the agriculture of the Midwestern 
states  would  benefit  from  the  industrial  boom.  The 
Homestead Act of 1862 had offered free land for families 
in the Midwest; 15,000 homestead claims were established 
by  1865  (5).  In  the  late  19th  century,  tractors  enabled 
farmers to increase crop size, and railroads carried the 
harvest to distant markets. But railroad monopolies forced 
the  farmers  to  accept  excessive  shipping  charges,  and 
farmers went into debt for modern farming equipment to 
maintain competitive production. A downward economic 
spiral evolved. Farmers cultivated more land to improve 
yield, increased yield led to lower crop prices, and farmers 
plowed even more land to improve productivity. By the 
1880s the Midwest had greater per capita debt than any 
other part of the country (6,7).
In the Northeast, mechanization decreased the require-
ment for skilled workers and created an enormous num-
ber of new jobs for untrained labor. The great northern 
migration of more than 250,000 African Americans began 
(8). Still there were not enough workers, and women and 
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the workforce increased from 2.6 million in 1880 to 7.8 
million in 1910 (7,9). By 1910, 25% of US children were 
in the labor force (10). Still there were not enough, and 
between 1890 and 1925, 25 million immigrants, first from 
northwestern Europe and then from southern and eastern 
Europe, arrived in the United States, many of them set-
tling in New York City (7).
Meanwhile,  Southern  entrepreneurs  yearned  to  erase 
the  image  of  a  defeated  Confederacy  and  proclaimed 
“the  New  South.”  Henry  Grady,  editor  of  The  Atlanta 
Constitution, outlined its 3 concepts: north and south were 
no longer different, black and white were now equal, and 
industrialization was replacing plantation agriculture (11-
13). These themes were echoed in other public forums on 
the future of the Southern states. The Southern railroad 
system became one of the best in the country. Cotton mills, 
coal and iron mines, and tobacco factories became major 
industries (11). Alongside these factories were old planta-
tions that became tenant and sharecropping lands, where 
the  lives  of  poor  black  and  white  tenant  farmers  were 
barely better than those of the earlier slaves.
As  the  new  century  neared,  the  dispossessed  fought 
back. The progressive movement encouraged government 
activism in immigrant welfare, antitrust policies, women’s 
suffrage,  child  labor  laws,  and  political  corruption  (14). 
The Grange, founded in 1867 in the Midwest, promoted 
pro-farmer legislation and farming cooperatives. By 1875 
it had approximately 850,000 members; it was succeeded 
by  other  farmers’  alliances  that  eventually  became  the 
core of the Populist political party (6). Samuel Gompers 
organized  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  (AFL)  in 
1886 (10). The National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), directed by W.E.B. Dubois, 
formed in 1909 (15).
The  Women’s  Christian  Temperance  Union  (WCTU), 
established in 1874, had a branch in almost every county 
in the country by 1883 (16). The organization supported 
a wide range of social interests, including day care nurs-
eries, homeless missions, prison and labor reform, child 
labor laws, and women’s suffrage. A more secular group, 
the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC) was 
organized in 1890 from independent women’s clubs (pri-
marily library associations) that already existed across the 
country  (17,18).  Both  groups’  activities  developed  wom-
en’s organizational and leadership skills and eventually   
represented  millions  of  members.  Barred  from  the  for-
mal political process but convinced of their moral duty to 
improve society, these women’s groups became a powerful 
voice in social reform.
The Gilded Age crashed in the Panic of 1893 (19). A run 
on gold reserves led to a 4-year depression as destructive 
as that of the 1930s. More than 15,000 businesses went 
bankrupt; banks, railroads, and farms were particularly 
hard-hit. The laissez-faire approach had failed to provide 
economic security for American families.
Worms
The story
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Southeast was 
still recovering from the Civil War. Despite the proclama-
tions of a New South, agriculture remained the primary 
source of employment, but Southern agricultural yield was 
the worst in the country. The states’ public education and 
health infrastructures were weak to nonexistent. Twelve 
percent  of  white  adults  and  50%  of  African  American 
adults were illiterate (20).
The  poor  of  all  races  still  suffered.  In  the  Plessy  v 
Ferguson Supreme Court decision of 1896, “separate but 
equal”  accommodations  became  legal  on  railroad  cars 
(11), and Southern states extended the interpretation to 
all public settings, creating a second-class black citizenry 
with little access to community resources. There was also 
the grim image of the poor white “cracker,” with sallow 
skin,  bare  feet,  scrawny  neck,  protuberant  abdomen, 
retarded  intelligence,  and  shiftless  habits  (20).  Poverty 
existed throughout the South, but a striking band of des-
peration extended across its coastal plain — a flat, sandy 
region  created  by  the  receding  of  an  ancient  sea.  Here 
families  lived  in  shanties  without  sanitation  and  sup-
ported themselves on subsistence farming (21).
In  1902  the  zoologist  Charles  Stiles  discovered  that 
Necator americanus — the hookworm, the “germ of lazi-
ness”  (20)  —  was  widespread  in  the  coastal  plain.  The 
hookworm enters its host through the skin, often between 
the  toes,  then  passes  into  the  bloodstream.  It  travels 
through the blood vessels to the lungs, moves up the bron-
chial tubes to the throat, and is swallowed. The worm then 
makes its permanent home in the small intestine, where 
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it secretes anticoagulants and sucks blood from the intes-
tinal mucosa of its host. One infected individual may have 
several hundred parasites that lay up to 10,000 eggs per 
day; these eggs pass out of the victim’s body in the feces. 
The infection can persist for years; its most striking effect 
is severe anemia caused by bleeding into the intestinal 
tract (22). Over time, this chronic blood loss leads to pale 
skin, weight loss, and abdominal edema; the low blood oxy-
gen levels decrease mental and physical function.
During this same time, the wealthy industrialist John 
D. Rockefeller turned to philanthropy. He sponsored sev-
eral projects, including programs in education and agricul-
ture in the South. In 1909 he established the Rockefeller 
Sanitary  Commission  for  the  Eradication  of  Hookworm 
Disease.  Its  purpose  was  to  characterize  the  extent  of 
hookworm disease in the South and conduct a campaign 
to reduce its prevalence (20). The first hookworm survey 
(1910-1911), conducted in 600 Southern counties, identi-
fied  an  infection  rate  among  children  of  40%  (23)  and 
estimated that 7.5 million Southerners were infected (24). 
People living in the coastal plain had the highest rates of 
infection; the sandy soil created the most inviting environ-
ment for hookworm larvae. This sandy soil was better for 
farming than the red clay hills of the Southern piedmont, 
but agricultural productivity here was the lowest in the 
region (23,24).
The Rockefeller Commission embarked on an extensive 
campaign, working closely with state and local partners 
(20). It promoted physician training and sponsored state 
laboratories  that  were  equipped  to  identify  hookworm 
larvae. It encouraged traveling dispensaries that not only 
diagnosed and treated infected individuals but provided 
public education in a tent-revival–like atmosphere, using 
local  children’s  choirs  and  similar  entertainments  to 
encourage attendance. In particular the campaign focused 
on  schools,  developing  designs  for  sanitary  privies  and 
health education for children and teachers.
The  commission  stepped  around  concerns  of  race.  It 
recognized the importance of black health and education; 
Rockefeller had funded the black women’s seminary that 
was  the  precursor  to  Spelman  College  in  Atlanta,  and 
he  had  supported  other  efforts  in  black  education.  But 
Stiles’ reports of hookworm in former slaves had created a 
backlash, as Southern whites blamed African families for 
bringing the worm to America. The commission’s program 
director did not collect race-specific information from the 
dispensaries, but he received frequent reports from field 
observers  who  informally  evaluated  the  percentage  of 
black participants attending the dispensaries. These were 
not quantitative assessments, but the commission feared 
publishing  real  data  would  provide  fodder  for  resentful 
whites who might destroy the project altogether (20).
The analysis
The science was clear in this event. Hookworm infesta-
tion was widespread in the South, and hookworm infec-
tion, with its resulting anemia, was a direct cause of slug-
gish productivity among Southern agricultural workers. 
Rockefeller’s support led to an improved, functional health 
infrastructure. The challenge was political will.
The New South supporters were incensed by the cam-
paign. The claims of extensive hookworm disease directly 
countered their efforts to create the image of a prosperous 
region. Southern newspapers denounced Rockefeller as a 
carpetbagger and a patronizing Northerner. Some claimed 
the campaign’s recommended prevention measure of wear-
ing shoes was a ruse to create new markets for footwear 
in the South (20). Perhaps even more critical, the citizens 
of rural communities often resented and even refused the 
efforts of outsiders to “control” their schools (20,25). 
Despite  these  challenges,  public  policy  led  to  change. 
The commission existed from 1909 to 1914. At its close 
the  campaign  had  not  eradicated  hookworm;  neverthe-
less,  it  left  an  impressive  legacy.  The  commission  was 
the  immediate  precursor  of  the  Rockefeller  Foundation 
and its International Health Board, which funded hook-
worm eradication programs around the world. The cam-
paign enhanced the impetus for reforms already initiated 
by  Progressive  Southerners.  Rockefeller  had  previously 
established a General Education Board to support public 
education in the South (20). Educators used the hookworm 
campaign to emphasize that the health of schoolchildren 
was  linked  to  their  learning,  leading  to  programs  for 
school  construction,  sanitation,  and  health  inspections 
(25). Accompanying these efforts were increases in school 
enrollment, attendance, and literacy (23).
The government’s recognition of its role in hookworm 
eradication led to new state and county health departments 
(20,26). Agricultural productivity also increased between 
1910 and 1920, in part because of the improved health 
of  farm  laborers  (24).  Farm  demonstration  programs,   
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of Agriculture, proved that proper agricultural techniques 
allowed  successful  cotton  crops  despite  the  boll  weevil. 
The  success  of  these  complementary  activities  enabled 
Southern members of Congress to secure passage of the 
Smith-Lever Agricultural Extension Act of 1914 (23,25), 
which established the Agricultural Extension Service and 
provided a combination of federal and state funding to link 
university agricultural research to local farming practice. 
This law, considered one of the most important US agricul-
tural bills ever passed, would serve as the model for later 
legislation in child health.
Germs
The story
While Rockefeller promoted privies in the South, other 
Northern reformists focused their attention on immigrant 
health in the tenements of urban communities. The enor-
mous waves of immigrants overwhelmed available hous-
ing: in New York City, 3 to 4 families might crowd into 
homes intended for 1. Population density in the tenement 
sections of the city was the greatest in the world, estimat-
ed to reach 290,000 per square mile (27,28). These neigh-
borhoods had no systems for plumbing or sewage disposal; 
rotting food and horse droppings filled the streets. Only 
the most low-paying, unskilled jobs were available to these 
immigrants. The labor unions refused them membership 
because  they  had  replaced  skilled  workers.  Immigrant 
women  worked  outside  the  home  or  did  piecework;  the 
children wandered the dangerous streets without atten-
tion and entered the labor force at an early age (27).
Infant mortality rates in the tenements were the highest 
in the country. In particular, summer epidemics of cholera 
infantum, or infant diarrhea, killed thousands of infants 
every year (29). In New York City in 1882, 50% of infant 
deaths were attributed to diarrheal diseases (29). Health 
authorities referred to these as “filth diseases,” a concept 
linked to miasma theories, and attributed the deaths to 
the filthy conditions and impure air of the urban environ-
ment and to the ignorance and poor hygiene of immigrant 
parents (29).
However,  as  bacteriology  became  an  established  sci-
ence, contaminated milk was identified as a more specific 
cause of infant mortality. Pediatricians and social activists 
agreed that breast milk was the best nutrition for infants, 
but they also recognized that mothers working outside the 
home were forced to use artificial feedings (30). Reformers 
hoped that supplying clean milk to poor immigrant fami-
lies was an achievable solution to cholera infantum. They 
turned to the French model of “milk stations”: programs in 
poor neighborhoods where mothers could obtain safe cows’ 
milk for their babies (31).
Philanthropist  Nathan  Straus,  co-owner  of  the  Macy 
department stores, funded some of New York’s first milk 
stations as well as a pasteurized milk bottling plant; by 
1896 these milk stations were feeding more than 2,000 
infants a day and supplying more than 600,000 bottles 
of  milk  a  year  (31).  The  city  government  established  a 
Division of Child Hygiene within the city health depart-
ment in 1905; because of the success of the Straus stations, 
the division provided funds in 1911 to support additional 
infant milk stations (29). Soon the milk station concept 
expanded to social and health education programs, includ-
ing  well-child  care  at  station  sites  and  home  visiting 
nurses to educate immigrant families in domestic hygiene 
and infant care (32).
The  Division  of  Child  Hygiene  organized  after-school 
programs, “Little Mothers’ Leagues,” that taught girls how 
to care for younger siblings while their mothers worked. 
The  girls  also  received  instruction  in  volunteerism  and 
civics  (31).  The  division’s  workers  hoped  the  education 
would enable the first immigrant generation born in the 
United States to rise out of the poverty that affected their 
families’ welfare.
The measurement of New York infant mortality rates 
depended  on  a  weak  vital  record  reporting  system. 
However, its data indicate a decline in the infant death 
rate from 248 per 1,000 infants born in 1885 to 80 per 
1,000 in 1919 (29).
The analysis
In the story of New York infant health, science again 
provided a solid basis for action. Germs in the milk could 
be prevented through a city government infrastructure, 
and  political  will  engendered  by  the  Progressive  move-
ment  supported  such  infrastructure.  Then  individual 
urban programs grew into a national movement, and over 
the next 20 years dramatic changes in political will led to 
frequent shifts in public policy.
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The American Association for Study and Prevention of 
Infant Mortality (AASPIM) formed in 1909. This national 
organization  emphasized  that  social  reform  and  health 
education were essential to support healthy children (31). 
The first priority was to improve vital statistics reporting 
in all states so infant mortality could be accurately deter-
mined. Ultimately, the drive to document infant deaths 
became a primary force in the development of the modern 
US vital statistics reporting system (29).
Another plank in the AASPIM platform was to fos-
ter communication and coordination among the many 
organizations involved in infant health. These political 
efforts led to the establishment of the federal Children’s 
Bureau  in  1912,  which  was  mandated  to  “investigate 
and report on all matters pertaining to the welfare of 
children” (33). In turn, the bureau’s research into the 
social  aspects  of  child  health  supported  the  call  for 
federal  funding  to  promote  local  programs,  similar  to 
well-baby clinics, which would educate mothers about 
preventive child care (34). The chief of the Children’s 
Bureau  cited  the  Smith-Lever  Agricultural  Extension 
Act  as  a  model  for  federal  funding  through  matching 
grants to interested states (29,35).
Bills  to  support  these  programs  were  introduced  into 
Congress in several sessions, but not until 1921 did a bill 
appear that seemed likely to become law. It faced strong 
opposition. Politicians argued that it was too expensive 
and violated the separation of state and federal respon-
sibilities.  Physicians  were  coming  into  their  own  as  a 
profession and feared any intrusion into their field; the 
American Medical Association and American Gynecologic 
Society  claimed  that  the  bill  would  interfere  with  the 
practice of medicine. Opponents of women’s suffrage said 
it would weaken the family and transfer parental author-
ity to the government, and that its premise arose from 
Bolshevik philosophy (29).
But  one  political  reality  above  all  others  favored  the 
bill’s  passage:  women  had  received  the  vote  in  1920, 
and  women’s  organizations  considered  the  Sheppard-
Towner Maternity and Infancy Act a universal women’s 
issue. A coalition of 14 women’s organizations, including 
the WCTU, GFWC, League of Women Voters, National 
Council  of  Jewish  Women,  and  the  General  Federation 
of Business and Professional Women, urged members to 
write their congressmen and senators. Good Housekeeping, 
McCall’s, and Ladies’ Home Journal published supporting   
editorials (29). No one knew whether newly enfranchised 
women  would  vote  en  bloc  for  women’s  and  children’s 
issues, but no elected official, regardless of personal views, 
wanted to risk offending an enormous new group of voters. 
The Sheppard-Towner Act passed in 1921.
By 1922, 41 states elected to match Sheppard-Towner 
funds. Tens of thousands of mothers and children received 
prenatal  and  well-child  consultations,  visiting  nurses 
made hundreds of thousands of home visits, and educa-
tional  pamphlets  reached  millions  of  readers.  Mothers 
showered the Children’s Bureau with letters expressing 
their appreciation (29). Backers of the act expected easy 
passage when it was scheduled for renewal in 1926.
However, political will had changed. It was now clear 
that female voting split along party rather than sex lines. 
President Coolidge and the Republican party pressed for a 
reduction in government programs (29). All the opponents 
of the 1921 passage, and more, appeared in force. Medical 
practitioners became an even stronger resistant force, and 
the earlier multidisciplinary partnership of the AASPIM 
could no longer hold. Only a 2-year extension was granted, 
and the program permanently closed in 1929. The public 




World  War  I  marked  a  shift  in  political  winds  from 
Progressivism  to  a  war  and  postwar  conservatism. 
Among  other  changes,  these  new  perspectives  opened 
the door for a serious national contemplation of alcohol 
temperance. Temperance had been discussed for decades: 
progressive women’s groups believed alcohol temperance 
was  a  key  tool  in  promoting  community  welfare  (36). 
Activists blamed alcohol for multiple social evils — crime, 
violence, unemployment, and poverty. Their focus was a 
blue-collar laborer who spent his paycheck in the saloon, 
where he consorted with prostitutes, gamblers, and cor-
rupt politicians, then returned home to thrash his wife 
and children.
During the war effort, temperance was promoted as 
a way to reserve grain needed for bread. In addition, 
“anti-Kaiser” sentiment flourished against the German 
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trolled most saloons. The Ku Klux Klan, most commonly 
remembered for its violence against African Americans 
in the South, also targeted multiple immigrant groups, 
especially  those  who  were  Jewish  and  Catholic,  in 
the  Midwest  and  Western  United  States  (36,37).  The 
Klan’s  support  of  temperance  was  a  reaction  to  the 
ritual and social consumption of alcohol by these groups. 
Temperance  came  to  be  associated  with  Protestant, 
rural,  and  conservative  voters,  while  antitemperance 
was  supported  by  Catholic,  urban,  freethinking  vot-
ers. Amid the clash of these groups, the constitutional 
amendment establishing Prohibition (18th Amendment) 
passed in 1919.
But alcohol consumption persisted during Prohibition. 
The  spirits  of  choice  depended  on  social  class.  The 
upper class could afford smuggled bonded whiskey from 
Canada; others turned to homemade moonshine. Some 
of  the  poorest  citizens  drank  cheap  Jamaican  ginger 
extract.  “Jake”  was  a  patent  medicine  that  had  been 
widely available before the 18th Amendment; its des-
ignated use was a few drops of extract added to water 
for  treating  respiratory  infections,  indigestion,  and 
irregular  menses,  but  its  popularity  derived  from  its 
70% alcohol content. The federal Bureau of Prohibition 
required  that  the  percentage  of  ginger  solids  in  the 
extract be raised to 5 g/cm3, creating a liquid too bitter 
to drink for other than medicinal purposes. Regulatory 
compliance was assessed by boiling down the marketed 
product and measuring the weight of the remaining sol-
ids, so would-be bootleggers had to find adulterants that 
would  reduce  the  strong  taste  and  meet  the  required 
solid weight content (38).
In  February  1930,  a  physician  in  Oklahoma  City, 
Oklahoma, saw 5 cases in the same day of a mysteri-
ous paralysis of the legs (39,40). Investigation by city 
public  health  authorities  found  65  additional  cases. 
More newspaper reports from across the country accu-
mulated within weeks: Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Louisiana,  Kansas,  Massachusetts,  Texas,  Missouri, 
Oklahoma, Ohio — the count of cases grew to the tens of 
thousands (38). The characteristic findings were initial 
numbness in the legs, followed by a paralysis of the toes 
and feet that caused a “foot-drop” gait in which victims 
lifted their feet high and then put down the toe before 
the heel. This high-stepping, foot-slapping gait became 
known as the “jake walk.” Often a similar wrist drop 
paralysis followed (40).
Recovered samples of the extract went to the Bureau 
of Industrial Alcohol, which identified the adulterant as 
tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate (TOCP), a chemical that at the 
time was not recognized as poison. The National Institute 
of  Health  conducted  field  investigations  and  collected 
more samples. Additional pharmacologic and animal test-
ing indicated that the suspected samples were contami-
nated with TOCP and that this compound caused the jake 
paralysis (40,41).
The analysis
The infrastructure of laws and bureaucracy begins this 
story. Individual efforts to subvert the infrastructure led 
to catastrophe, which in turn led to scientific efforts to 
identify a poison. But political will generated only a weak 
response.
Two  partners  of  a  Boston  firm  were  charged  with 
illegal  alcohol  distribution  and  falsely  labeled  products 
and  received  fines  and  probation.  In  1932,  one  eventu-
ally  began  a  2-year  prison  term  (40).  The  Food  and 
Drug Administration was not yet empowered to require 
premarket testing of products for safety (42). Thus, the 
conspirators could not be charged for injury to thousands 
of consumers.
Nor did public policy change. The victims of jake paraly-
sis were marked by their unique gait; conservative neigh-
bors and even the afflicted themselves believed their own 
irresponsibility had destroyed their lives. Few of those who 
were poisoned made a full recovery: the United Victims of 
Ginger Paralysis Association claimed 30,000 members and 




The Mississippi River wanders for more than 2,000 miles 
through the middle of the country, draining 41% of the 
continental United States (43,44). For centuries the river 
has brought fertile soil down its course and deposited it in 
the Delta region of Mississippi and other nearby Southern 
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states. But these nutrients traveled with floodwaters that 
periodically destroyed structures and crops and drowned 
people and livestock. With industrialization, the need to 
prevent this flooding grew urgent.
Inevitably, politics controlled river development. One-
crop cotton farming still dominated the lower river basin 
after  the  Civil  War.  The  plantation  owners  manipu-
lated taxation at local levels, exploited the cheap labor 
of ex-slaves, and obtained taxpayer assistance at state 
and federal levels to maintain river flow. In the 1880s 
the river was channeled to allow shipping. In 1884 the 
Mississippi  legislature  created  the  Yazoo-Mississippi 
River Levee District to build levees along state tributar-
ies of the Mississippi River, and in 1917 the Army Corps 
of  Engineers  took  over  levee  building  (43,44).  It  was 
to all players’ advantage, except that of the sharecrop-
pers, to believe that inexpensive levees (the “levee-only 
policy”) were sufficient protection against floods.
The 1-crop farming system linked the Delta region’s 
diet to the seasonal economics of cotton: salt pork, corn 
meal,  and  cane  syrup  were  staples,  while  vegetables, 
milk, eggs, and fresh meat seldom appeared on the din-
ner  table  of  a  sharecropping  family,  especially  in  the 
winter. Pellagra was widespread. The initial symptom, 
a “butterfly” dermatitis that spread across the face and 
other  sun-exposed  parts  of  the  body,  created  the  red-
neck stigmata that popular national culture extended to 
the South as a whole, though the rash was by no means 
limited  to  those  of  light  skin. Diarrhea soon followed, 
and when the afflicted grew demented their family mem-
bers knew that death might come soon (mortality rates 
at this stage were 50% and higher), completing the “4 
D’s” of the pellagra syndrome (45).
By 1920 Joseph Goldberger had made his name from 
his pellagra research in southern orphanages, “insane 
asylums,” and mill towns (45). He identified that pel-
lagra  resulted  from  the  “meat,  meal,  and  molasses” 
plate and was a dietary deficiency disease rather than 
the result of infection or improperly milled corn. Field 
research in pellagra progressed from mill towns to the 
Georgia  State  Sanitarium  in  Milledgeville,  where  vic-
tims  of  pellagra  dementia  were  housed.  Goldberger’s 
work confirmed that pellagra was common in the South. 
The diet investigations identified brewer’s yeast as an 
effective, inexpensive preventive and cure (45).
Henry  Grady  was  long  dead,  but  other  New  South 
spokesmen were infuriated. Once more Yankee voices had 
proclaimed a widespread disease of poverty in the South. 
Yet the Mississippi state board of health recognized the 
pellagra epidemic and in 1920 held a state conference to 
discuss action. In 1921 an investigation of the Delta region 
found it had 60% of the state’s cases but only 20% of the 
state’s population (45).
Then  came  what  Herbert  Hoover  described  as  the 
“greatest  disaster  in  peace  times  in  our  history”:  the 
1927 Mississippi flood (45). The river ignored the levees 
and  flooded  23,000  square  miles;  by  early  June,  112 
counties and 12 states were under water, and 700,000 
people were displaced (45). The first pellagra cases in the 
Red Cross camps were reported in July.
Goldberger toured Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
and  Louisiana  and  estimated  that  45,000  to  50,000 
cases existed across the region. The Red Cross created a 
massive, uncontrolled natural experiment, distributing 
12,000 pounds of yeast. The distribution was followed 
by a rapid decline in the number of reported cases and 
improvement in disease symptoms. For the first time, 
the pellagra-prevention diet proved effective in a large 
population (45).
The analysis
Scientific  theory  was  confirmed  on  a  grand  scale. 
Then the waters receded. The displaced went home, and 
infrastructure  development  began.  Pellagra  education 
had begun in the camps; now the Red Cross initiated 
long-term prevention with additional information, food 
packages, even cows sent home with departing families. 
Farmers were advised to set aside land for a food crop as 
well as an economic crop. The state health department 
of  Mississippi  launched  a  major  education  campaign, 
distributing yeast through local drugstores and provid-
ing weekly clinics (45).
Yet the disease didn’t disappear. In fact, it increased 
during  the  next  2  years  as  rural  sharecroppers’  diets 
remained unchanged — poverty and culture barring the 
way to healthful foods. Public policy was stalled by old 
political will and economics. In 1927 Goldberger angered 
Southerners yet again with an article in Public Health 
Reports: he identified 1-crop farming as the underlying 
cause for the Mississippi epidemic (46). But the disease 
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fied with vitamins in the late 1930s and 1940s (47).
Conclusion
Public health leadership 
We  can  look  across  these  stories  as  well  as  within 
them and see elements familiar to modern public health 
professionals:  a  shifting  economic  base,  global  human 
migrations, changing avenues of communication, clashing 
cultures, prejudice against “the other,” the aftereffects of 
war, the belief  that the disadvantaged deserve their ill 
luck. The Richmond-Kotelchuck model offers the analytic 
structure that demonstrates that these elements are all 
intertwined with health. Public health workers have had 
mixed success in addressing the barriers they identify. Our 
science works diligently on the risk factors, causes, diag-
noses, and treatments of disease. The initial efforts may 
not succeed, but the skill and impetus to continue search-
ing often result in ultimate success. Public health experts 
excel in building infrastructure. In rural or urban settings, 
for children or adults, in the mainstream population or for 
the disadvantaged, addressing the need for immunization 
or chronic health problems such as hypertension, public 
health programs have designed unique infrastructures to 
support populations in need.
But these 4 stories bring us back to political will. Ronald 
Heifetz, author of Leadership Without Easy Answers, sug-
gests 2 kinds of leadership problems (48). The first requires 
technical solutions: the problem is known, the solution is 
recognized, and to move from one to the other requires 
the use of known skills and experience. Civic disruption 
is no more than mild, and social attitudes remain much 
the same. The “Back to Sleep” campaign to prevent sud-
den infant death syndrome (SIDS) might be an example of 
successful technical problem solving. Research identified 
a major risk factor for SIDS, a national public education 
campaign ensued, and parents found it easy to put babies 
on their backs instead of stomachs to sleep (49).
The second leadership problem requires adaptive change. 
Adaptive change is about political will. The change requires 
a significant paradigm shift in science, systems, and social 
attitudes, and the shift must occur in the face of substan-
tial  resistance  from  the  affected  sectors.  Leaders  may 
take the easier course of treating adaptive challenges as   
technical ones — people accept that professionals will pro-
vide technical answers, while no one may know the answer 
to or consequence of an adaptive change.
Adaptive change
The  need  for  paradigm  shift  exists  when  society’s 
expressed values and its behavior differ. The Progressive 
Era arose from the public realization that laissez-faire eco-
nomics and industrial power did not provide the individual 
economic  security  they  claimed.  The  formations  of  the 
NAACP, the Grange, the AFL, and the GFWC marked the 
beginnings of a shift from laissez-faire economics to new 
expectations of government. The shift carried upheaval — 
women and blacks demanding social change, labor power 
rising to balance the employers’, agricultural systems giv-
ing way to industrial ones. New stories appear when old 
ones are not sustainable; they are resisted because they 
arrive with economic and social costs.
An  adaptive  need  may  be  recognized  without  receiv-
ing action. Because change is unpredictable, only a sense 
of urgency will drive people to consider it. If pandemic 
influenza is sweeping the country, high levels of public 
distress will create the urgency for change. At other times 
the public refuses to accept a problem as urgent. The New 
South boosters, the industrialists, and the anti-immigra-
tion movement were not ready to accept that their stories 
were inadequate. In the early days of the recognition of 
acquired immune deficiency disease, most of the popula-
tion believed the infection was restricted to a small num-
ber of men having sex with other men. Popular attitudes 
were similar to those toward the victims of jake paralysis: 
the affected individuals’ behaviors were socially unaccept-
able, therefore they deserved their affliction and “normal 
people” need not worry.
As stress increases, the temptation rises to find easier 
alternatives. Women leaders of the temperance movement 
believed outlawing alcohol would eliminate multiple social 
ills. The fight for temperance was long and difficult, but it 
was still easier to pass prohibition legislation than to con-
trol violence, prostitution, or poverty. The current debate 
about universal health care is a modern example. Over 
the past 2 decades provider-driven care, health mainte-
nance organizations, health savings accounts, consumer-
controlled health plans, government-based insurance, tax 
credits, and a host of other technical options have been 
proposed. The adaptive question, however, is whether our 
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social  contract  includes  providing  health  care  for  every 
citizen. Until we recognize the question, technical solu-
tions will not succeed.
Heifetz notes that the final, and perhaps most difficult, 
leadership role is giving the challenge back to the citizens. 
Leaders are tempted to “claim” big issues, while society 
waits for them to solve the problems and people go about 
their usual lives without accepting their essential roles in 
solutions.  Prohibition  did  not  prevent  alcohol  consump-
tion, much less its associated social evils, because much of 
the population did not support its premise. Authority can 
direct attention to the challenges; it is not able to resolve 
adaptive problems without involving the populace. 
Problem-solving for the 21st century
One of the greatest risks for public health profession-
als is to accept ownership of a problem. We recognize the 
importance of building partnerships, crossing boundaries, 
and involving communities, but we are not yet sufficiently 
humble about our ability to create adaptive change. We 
are strong in technical solutions, but how skilled are we 
at affecting the third sector of the Richmond-Kotelchuck 
model? We know that scientific evidence and infrastruc-
ture related to immunizations, safe sex, regular exercise, 
tobacco avoidance, and even universal health care are not 
always sufficient to drive political will. Do we have the 
ability to change social context? And can we gain wisdom 
from stories of the past?
Now, in the beginning of the 21st century, societal pres-
sures are building once more. In the United States another 
major economic transition is progressing, changing from 
an industrial base to a service-oriented, information base. 
Accompanying  that  change  are  labor  migrations  associ-
ated with a global economy; this time work is traveling 
abroad to the workers. At the same time, immigrants con-
tinue to arrive, and anti-immigrant bias is now directed 
toward those with Mexican and South American origins. 
The quality of child health programs and public schools is 
at risk. The percentage of older adults in the population 
is rising: a greater Medicare burden is predicted, but the 
generation now maturing will be healthier and live longer. 
What will this mean for the national workforce and health 
care demands? Shifting warfare, infrastructure, and ecol-
ogy concerns overlay these other stresses.
How do these stories speak to the role of public health 
workers? Perhaps we cannot force change, but we can offer 
leadership  in  our  own  arena,  we  can  inform  paradigm 
shift,  we  can  tip  events  toward  a  successful  resolution. 
The Rockefeller Commission and Southern Progressives 
combined  an  understanding  of  hookworm  infestation, 
agricultural productivity, and school health to stimulate 
political  will  for  better  lives  among  rural  Southerners. 
Goldberger’s understanding of social constructs informed 
his  research  and  recommendations  for  eradicating  pel-
lagra,  and  his  work  was  essential,  ultimately,  for  the 
fortification  of  bread.  Sometimes  our  success  is  partial. 
Child health activists and the Children’s Bureau placed 
an early emphasis on the connection between health and 
social welfare; later medical interests separated those con-
cepts. Sometimes we fail. Public health researchers identi-
fied the cause of jake paralysis, but there was no call to 
improve the lives of the afflicted or to find ways to prevent 
future catastrophe.
At its heart, public policy is about the choices of citizens 
in a cooperative endeavor. What are the early warning 
signs that these choices are at odds with professed beliefs? 
Where might we hear the first rumblings of a social shift? 
Will we understand the archetypal stories people use in 
health  and  policy  decisions?  Perhaps  we  need  to  teach 
ourselves another way of observing, to learn more about 
incorporating  intuitive  as  well  as  data-driven  evidence 
into action. Too often, of course, we have acted without 
evidence, and no one advocates a return to that practice. 
But given our struggles with political will, it seems we 
need not only new data but also new tools for understand-
ing the data.
The events described here grew out of the earlier history 
of the Gilded Age and in turn created the context for what 
we  face  today.  The  stories  illustrate  that  public  policy 
results from multiple elements, some of which developed 
long before current crises. In helping us understand politi-
cal will, the past offers not only informative case studies 
but also narrative components of contemporary challeng-
es. For us to offer leadership to influence change, we need 
to immerse ourselves in story, past and present.
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